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Abstract
One can be independent, or subject to decisions made by others. This paper empirically tests
whether individuals attach an intrinsic value to the institutional difference between
independence and hierarchy. Taking self-employment as an important case of independence,
it is shown that the self-employed derive more utility from their work than people employed
by an organization, irrespective of income gained or hours worked. This is evidence for
procedural utility: people do not only value outcomes, but also the conditions and processes
leading to these outcomes.
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1. Self-Employment Provides Procedural Utility
The economic research on happiness has identified the major determinants of self-reported
subjective well-being or happiness. Among the many factors systematically influencing it,
employment stands out.
1 Persons who are unemployed are much less happy than other
persons, even when other influences such as lower income are controlled for. Being employed
seems to be a value over and above the income it generates.
This paper argues that there is another, so far neglected, but also very important aspect linking
happiness and employment: self-employment provides “procedural utility”. Procedural utility
means that people not only value outcomes, but also the conditions and processes leading to
outcomes. Individuals derive utility from being self-employed because it gives them a higher
measure of self-determination and freedom. In contrast, persons in dependent employment
have to obey orders given by their superiors. Independence and hierarchy are fundamentally
different institutional processes, and individuals may value independence as such. Clearly,
such procedural utility differs from outcome utility
2 which in the case of work relates in
particular to income and working hours. As around 10 percent of all individuals gainfully
employed in Western countries are self-employed, a substantial share of workers is affected.
We claim that procedural utility is a useful concept to analyse the labor market and provide
strong empirical evidence of its existence and size for self-employed persons. While we
believe that it is an important and in economics so far disregarded phenomenon, this does not
mean that (self-)employment would not provide any outcome utility. Indeed, we empirically
demonstrate that outcome utility is provided positively by income, and negatively by working
hours.
This paper wants to show that procedural utility plays a relevant and independent role. For the
three countries of our study, Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, self-employed
people show higher job satisfaction (our proxy measure for utility from work). The raw
difference is smallest in the case of West Germany (0.21 index points on a job satisfaction
scale from 0-10) and reaches a similar magnitude in Britain (0.21 index points on a job
satisfaction scale from 1-7) and Switzerland (0.41 index points on a job satisfaction scale
from 0-10). These differences, however, might reflect a multitude of characteristics that
distinguish self-employed people from employed people. Accounting for outcome aspects of
                                                   
1 The work by Clark and Oswald (1994), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey
(2001) and Clark (2002) is fundamental.
2 See, more fully, the introductory survey by Frey, Benz and Stutzer (2002).3
work is therefore essential to assess the procedural differences in satisfaction correctly. For
example, it could be that self-employed people work in less stressful jobs and industries,
which makes them more satisfied with their jobs. On the other hand, it is known that the self-
employed tend to earn less and work more than similar employed people (Hamilton 2000).
This would lead to an underestimation of procedural utility gained from being self-employed
if instrumental aspects of work are not controlled for. The multivariate econometric
regressions presented in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that the self-employed
are more satisfied with their jobs than employees, even when instrumental aspects of work are
controlled for. For all three countries, substantial and highly significant effects are found. The
results indicate that self-employed persons do not reap more utility from their work so much
because the outcomes are different. There are non-instrumental reasons at work that make the
self-employed happier with their jobs.
We try to look carefully at whether these results are robust. First, it is tested whether the
utility differences between the self-employed and other workers are due to selection effects. It
may be that happier persons choose to be self-employed. But we can empirically show that
this is unlikely to be the case. In order to further bolster our claim that procedural utility
matters in employment, we advance the related hypothesis that satisfaction is (ceteris paribus)
the lower the larger the hierarchy an employee is subject to. The results of our econometric
analysis are consistent with this proposition. We find that individuals value independence,
and the relative absence of hierarchy, for purely non-instrumental reasons closely connected
with notions of process.
Our study not only provides a more general view of the utility gained from work, but is also
relevant for policy. Following the results reached here, the government should at least not
restrict self-employment opportunities. The respective laws and regulations should be less
restrictive and the bureaucratic barriers for engaging in self-employment should be lowered,
because this would provide individuals with added procedural utility.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the concept of procedural utility and puts it into a theoretical
context. Section 3 presents the data composed of three comprehensive surveys of information
relating to work in Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The first two surveys
have a panel structure and cover data from 1984 to 2000 and from 1991 to 1999. The fourth
section presents the econometric estimates and results. Section 5 draws conclusions for
economic theory and policy.4
2. Procedural Utility and Employment
2.1. The concept of procedural utility in economics
Procedural utility means that people not only value actual outcomes, but also the conditions
and processes which lead to these outcomes. Procedural utility thus represents a completely
different approach to human well-being than the standard approach applied in economics. The
economic concept of utility is outcome-oriented: individual utility is seen as a result of
benefits and costs associated with instrumental outcomes and consequences. In contrast,
procedural utility refers to the non-instrumental pleasures and displeasures of processes. This
kind of utility has hardly been included in economic theory or empirical research.
Obviously, individuals care a lot about outcomes; economics has derived a powerful model of
human behavior based on this insight (Becker 1976, Frey 1999, Lazear 2000). Thereby, the
notion that outcomes are not the only source of utility and not the only driving force behind
behavior, was almost completely lost in economic analysis. A rare exception is the utility
gained from gambling, which was already considered by Pascal (1670), and later by
Marschak (1950) and by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953). Sen (1995, 1997) has
repeatedly argued that economic choice models should combine preferences for outcome with
those for processes. Recently, Le Menestrel (2001) established axioms for a model of rational
behavior combining processes and consequences. Research on intrinsic values of processes,
however, has mainly been carried out in other social sciences, especially by social
psychologists. Most prominently, the fairness or justice of procedures as a value as such has
been studied by Lind and Tyler (1988), Tyler (1990), and Tyler and Blader (2000).
This research from other social sciences suggests that there is something beyond instrumental
outputs as captured in a traditional economic utility function. People can have preferences
about how outcomes are generated. These preferences about procedures generate procedural
utility.
Procedural utility may come from several different sources. It is useful to distinguish two
broad categories. First, there is the procedural utility people get from institutions. People have
preferences about how allocative and redistributive decisions are taken. They get utility from
living and acting under particular institutions over and above outcomes. Second, it may be
argued that procedural utility is involved in the interaction between people. People evaluate
actions towards them not only based on the consequences, but also on how they feel treated
by other persons. An individual is, for example, emotionally affected in a negative way by an5
action when he or she attributes the actor with a criminal motive rather than a neutral motive,
quite irrespective of the outcome. This aspect of procedural utility is generally referred to as
procedural justice or procedural fairness in the literature (Thibaut and Walker 1975, Lind and
Tyler 1988).
2.2. Institutions as sources of procedural utility
This paper is mainly concerned with procedural utility from institutions. Institutions are
understood as rules or procedures with which decisions are taken in society. The price system
(market), democracy, hierarchy, and bargaining are generally seen as the most important
formal systems for reaching decisions (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). Previous research has
pointed to the possibility that individuals value institutions as such. For example, Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1986) suggested that individuals have some intrinsic concerns with the
market mechanism that go over and beyond outcome considerations. When put in a situation
of excess demand, a consistently high percentage of consumers in their surveys saw a price
increase to be an unfair means to overcome the shortage, thus rating a normal functioning of
the price system as unacceptable (similar results have been found for Switzerland and
Germany (Frey and Pommerehne 1993), the US (Konow 2001) and Russia (Shiller, Boyocko
and Korobov 1991). Other studies have been concerned with the institution of democracy. A
large literature in the social sciences, especially in psychology, political science and
sociology, attributes a positive value to participation, as it enhances individuals’ perception of
self-determination (for an extensive survey see Lane 2000, chapter 13). The rights to
participate in political decisions are a crucial characteristic of any democratic institution,
ranging from voting in elections, launching and voting on referenda, to running for a seat in
parliament. Citizens may reap procedural utility from such participation rights over and above
the outcome generated in the political process, because they provide a feeling of being
involved and having political influence, as well as a notion of inclusion, identity and self-
determination. Frey and Stutzer (2002a) empirically show for the case of Switzerland that
citizens reap such procedural utility from extended democratic participation rights.
2.3. Procedural utility from independence vs. hierarchy
With respect to work organization and production, hierarchy is the most fundamental
institution by which decisions are taken in society. Hierarchy means that production and
employment is integrated into an organization, and decisions are characterized by some6
degree of authority. Hierarchy is an essential and widespread feature of the economy.
Individuals may well attach an intrinsic value to it as an institutional procedure.
We hypothesize that this intrinsic value is a negative one. Extensive theoretical research by
psychologists suggests that individuals prefer characteristics of independence to being subject
to hierarchical decision making. For example, Ryan and Deci (2000) attribute an intrinsic
value to self-determination, which is strongly related to independence and generally restricted
under hierarchy. Self-determination is seen to provide procedural goods that serve innate
needs of competence, autonomy and relatedness. Similar approaches attach utility to the
actualization of human potentials (Ryff and Singer 1998) or to personal control (Grob 2000;
Peterson 1999; Seligman 1992). These approaches see the possibility to act independently as
a value in itself, i.e. individuals do not necessarily expect better instrumental outcomes from
it.
This paper presents an empirical test of whether individuals enjoy procedural utility from
independence vs. hierarchy. As an important empirical application, self-employment is
chosen. Self-employment presents in many respects a suitable field of study. People who are
self-employed or employed are essentially engaged in the same labor markets and production
activities. This makes the two groups very comparable. Of course, self-employed people face
some other external constraints, in particular those directly imposed by the market, but also
by government laws and regulations. With respect to work, however, the main difference
between the two groups is that the self-employed work independently and employees are
subject to a hierarchy.
3 We therefore propose that self-employed individuals derive higher
procedural utility from work than persons employed by organizations, over and above the
outcome utility from gaining income and other instrumental aspects of work. We will also
investigate a related hypothesis that directly follows from this first proposition. If the absence
of a hierarchy is intrinsically preferred to being subject to a hierarchy, people should also
prefer smaller hierarchies to larger hierarchies, if procedural utility has normal properties.
There already exists some research by economists indicating that self-employment provides a
utility premium. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Blanchflower (2000) and Blanchflower,
Oswald and Stutzer (2001) present evidence that the self-employed are more satisfied with
their jobs. Hamilton (2000) convincingly shows that self-employment does not pay, i.e. that
                                                   
3 The differences in external constraints imposed by the market and regulations can plausibly be disregarded,
because they make the life of self-employed rather harder than easier. For example, acting as an independent
contractor on the market carries more risk, and government regulations impose more administrative work on the7
the self-employed are willing to forego income in exchange for being independent. Although
this is strong evidence that self-employment provides (non-monetary) benefits, these authors
do not further study what these benefits exactly consist of. A study by Hundley (2001)
addresses this question in more detail and finds that the self-employed are happier with their
work because of more autonomy, flexibility, skill utilization, and to some extent also higher
job security. The evidence found in previous studies is thus overall consistent with our
hypothesis. Nevertheless, the studies have not explored in depth whether the utility premium
from self-employment reflects procedural utility from independence vs. hierarchy. The
present study places this question at the core of analysis.
2.4. Measuring utility
In order to make procedural utility a fruitful concept, it is not only necessary to specify the
conditions under which procedural utility is expected to be higher (or lower), but it is also
necessary to have a proxy measure for utility. In this paper, utility from work is measured by
using self-reported job satisfaction as a proxy variable. Job satisfaction has been increasingly
used by economists as a meaningful concept to analyse the labor market (e.g. Hamermesh
1977, Clark and Oswald 1996, Blanchflower and Oswald 1999, Clark 2001; for a survey see
Warr 1999). Its growing use reflects a more general change that economics has experienced in
recent years. Utility is increasingly seen as directly measurable by using self-reported
satisfaction measures as a proxy. For example, measures of subjective well-being (or
happiness) have been successfully applied in economic research e.g. by Clark and Oswald
(1994), Di Tella et al. (2001), Easterlin (2001), Frey and Stutzer (2000) and Kahneman et al.
(1997) (for surveys see Frey and Stutzer 2002b and Oswald 1997). The existing state of
research suggests that measures of reported satisfaction are a satisfactory empirical
approximation to individual utility (Frey and Stutzer 2002b). It is thus possible to study
procedural effects on individual well-being directly, which makes the notion of procedural
utility empirically tractable. With respect to (self-)employment, we propose that self-reported
job satisfaction can serve as an indicator for the utility people derive from their work.
                                                                                                                                                                   
self-employed. To the extent that these are valued negatively by individuals, one tends to underestimate the
utility premium of being independent when simply comparing the self-employed and the employed.8
3.  Data
The empirical analysis is based on three major data sets from European countries: the German
Socio Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and
the Swiss Household Panel Survey (SHP). The three surveys can be considered the most
comprehensive sources of information on work related aspects, income, and other socio-
economic variables in Europe. Germany, the United Kingdom and Switzerland are the only
European countries that regularly conduct detailed socio-economic surveys of their
population. The data sets have several advantages. First, compared to other data sets
previously used to test the effects of self-employment on job satisfaction (see e.g.
Blanchflower 2000), they contain much more detailed information on important work aspects,
such as income, working hours, occupation, education, industry and other individual and
firm-related characteristics. This allows us to more precisely hold the instrumental aspects of
work constant when assessing the procedural utility from independence vs. hierarchy. Second,
the European surveys include measures on job satisfaction which, for example, comparable
US surveys like the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the Current Population Survey do
not. Job satisfaction, however, is needed as a proxy for utility from work. Third, two of the
three surveys have a panel structure that can be exploited in the empirical analysis: the
GSOEP covers the years from 1984-2000 and the BHPS the years from 1991-1999, and
individuals can generally be observed over several waves. Fourth, the surveys contain some
unique information that allows for a more detailed investigation of procedural utility from
independence vs. hierarchy than previous studies have been able to undertake. And fifth, the
use of surveys from three different countries gives a broader picture of the robustness of the
estimated effects than when just one country is looked at. Although the three surveys come
from different sources, they have a similar structure, which makes it possible to make
meaningful comparisons of the respective results.
As the dependent variable in the empirical analysis, job satisfaction is used as a proxy for the
utility people derive from their work. In the German GSOEP, job satisfaction is assessed
using the following question: “How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your
life: your job?“ Individuals are asked to state their job satisfaction on a scale from 0 (totally
unhappy) to 10 (totally happy). The question asked in the British BHPS is similar: “All things
considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job overall?” Answers are
coded here on a somewhat narrower scale from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 (completely
satisfied). In Switzerland, the related question is “On a scale from 0 ‘not at all satisfied’ to 109
‘completely satisfied’, can you indicate your degree of satisfaction with your job in general?”
The question was only asked in 1999, which leaves one year of observation available for
Switzerland.
In general, individuals in the countries considered seem to be quite satisfied with their jobs. In
West Germany
4, over the period from 1984-2000, average job satisfaction of all individuals in
the workforce was 7.25 (st.d. 2.00) on a scale from 0 to 10.
5 In Britain, from 1991-1999,
workers were even somewhat more satisfied with their jobs, indicating an average value of
5.43 (st.d. 1.36) on a scale from 1-7. Job satisfaction was highest in Switzerland in 1999,
where the average worker stated a job satisfaction score of 8.10 (st.d 1.72) on a scale from 0
to 10.
The main purpose of the empirical investigation is to identify the procedural utility
individuals reap from independence vs. hierarchy. The first step of the analysis is focussed on
self-employed people, and the question is asked whether they reap procedural utility from not
being subject to a hierarchy. The dummy ‘self-employed’ takes on the value 1 when
individuals state that they are self-employed in a given year, and is 0 when people in the
workforce are employed by an organization. In West Germany, an average 8.3 percent of the
total workforce sampled in the GSOEP was self-employed in the years from 1984-2000, and
this ratio was relatively constant over the period (min 7.5%, max. 9.9%). In Britain, an
average 12.0 percent of the workforce was self-employed during the years from 1991-1999
(min. 11.0 %, max 12.5 %). In Switzerland the ratio amounted to 10.5 percent in 1999.
6
The three surveys contain detailed information on important control variables. Income and
working hours are core instrumental aspects of work and have to be controlled for when
                                                   
4 The GSOEP is split into the subsamples of West Germany and East Germany, which are used seperately in the
later empirical analysis. The characterstics of the East German economy were still very different from West
Germany over the period covered from 1990-2000. It thus seems warranted to use two subsamples. Average job
satisfaction for East german workers was 6.86 (st.d. 2.12) in the years from 1990-2000.
5 For all three countries, the mean job satisfaction values are computed from the final samples as used in the
empirical analysis of section 4. This only produces minor differences compared to using the full samples, but it
makes the descriptive statistics more comparable and consistent across the different stages of empirical analysis.
The surveys contain a substantial number of missing values for the variables of interest in the empirical analysis.
This leaves a sample size of 70‘229 observations from 11'700 individuals in West Germany from 1984-2000,
20'064 observations from 4'254 individuals in East Germany from 1990-2000, 52‘022 observations from 13'380
individuals in Britain from 1991-1999, and 3‘431 observations from 3'431 individuals in Switzerland 1999.
6 The ratios of self-employed people indicated are computed using the full samples of all people in the
workforce. In the case of Germany, the actual ratio of self-employed people in the final sample is somewhat
lower than in the full sample (5.6%), essentially because self-employed people seem to be more reluctant to state
their income. This potentially induces problems of measurement error which are discussed in the empirical
section. For the BHPS and the SHP, self-employment ratios in the final samples are similar to those in the full
samples. Overall, the ratios are comparable to those presented in other studies, e.g. Blanchflower, Oswald and10
assessing non-instrumental utility from work. In the empirical analysis, the total personal
income of an individual is used to account for effects of income on job satisfaction. The
influence of working hours is measured by using the total hours an individual works in an
average week (including overtime hours). Apart from these core control variables, the surveys
include information on tenure, age, gender, education, whether people work part-time or full-
time, and which occupation and industry they work in. This creates a large and detailed set of
control variables on the objective aspects of work. In the GSOEP, for example, there is
information on 7 categories of education, 88 categories of different occupations, and 45
industry categories. Similar sets of control variables are available for the BHPS and the SHP.
Descriptive statistics for each of the three different data sets are given in the appendix (Table
A).
In the second step of the empirical analysis, additional information is used that is somewhat
less comparable across the different data sets than the variables already described. For
example, the size of the organization that individuals work in will be incorporated in a further
analysis of procedural utility effects from hierarchy. This data is contained in all three
surveys, but the scaling of the variable differs to some extent. Some of the further empirical
analysis will also be carried out using the BHPS only, because this survey contains some
interesting questions on particular aspects of people’s jobs that the other two surveys do not
contain.
4.  Empirical Analysis
4.1. Basic regressions
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the differences in job satisfaction between self-
employed and employed individuals, and it contains the basic regressions on the effects of
self-employment on job satisfaction. For all three countries considered, the raw differences
show significantly higher job satisfaction for self-employed workers. The difference is
smallest in the case of West Germany (0.21 index points on a scale from 0-10) and reaches
similar magnitude in Britain (0.21 index points on a scale from 1-7) and Switzerland (0.41
index points on a scale from 0-10). These differences, however, might reflect a multitude of
characteristics that distinguish self-employed individuals from employed people. The
                                                                                                                                                                   
Stutzer (2001), which indicate self-employment ratios of 10.1% for West Germany, 13.6% for Britain and 13.6%
for Switzerland.11
question whether higher job satisfaction among the self-employed can be attributed to
procedural utility gained from being independent has thus to be investigated in more detail.
Table 1: Procedural Utility from Independence vs. Hierarchy:
Self-Employment and Job Satisfaction in Germany, Britain and Switzerland
Dependent variable: job satisfaction



































































































Education 7 categ. 12 categ. 10 categ.
Job dummies 88 categ. 73 categ. 31 categ.
Industry dummies 45 categ. 10 categ. 14 categ.
Year dummies 17 categ. 9 categ. -
No. of observations 70‘229 52‘022 3‘431
No. of individuals 11‘700 13‘380 3‘431
Time period 1984 - 2000 1991 - 1999 1999
F 5.85** 13.84**   3.44**
Notes: Weighted ordered logit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for repeated
observations on individuals). Significance levels: ° 0.1 < p < 0.05, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data sources: GSOEP 1984-2000, BHPS 1991-1999, SHP 1999.12
In a first step, multivariate regressions are run that include the control variables discussed in
the last section. Accounting for instrumental aspects of work is essential to assess the non-
instrumental satisfaction differences correctly. For example, it could be that self-employed
people work in less stressful jobs and industries, which makes them more satisfied with their
jobs. On the other hand, it is known that the self-employed tend to earn less and work more
than similar employed people (e.g. Hamilton 2000), which leads to an underestimation of the
procedural utility from being self-employed if such instrumental aspects are not controlled
for. The basic regressions presented in table 1 are estimated using an ordered logit model, as
job satisfaction is an ordinally scaled dependent variable. The weighting variables applied
allow representative results on the subject level for the respective country.
7 Moreover, in the
case of the German and British panel, the estimated robust standard errors are corrected for
repeated observations on the individual level over time.
The multivariate regressions confirm that the self-employed are more satisfied with their jobs
than employees, even when instrumental aspects of work are controlled for. For all three
countries, substantial and highly significant effects are found. Their size is comparable to the
raw differences indicated in table 1.
8 This corroborates and at the same time extends results
previously reported by Blanchflower (2000), Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer (2001) and
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). Whereas these authors have presented first evidence that
self-employed people are more satisfied with their jobs, they did not investigate whether this
is for instrumental or non-instrumental reasons (e.g. instrumental aspects such as income and
working hours are not controlled for). The results presented here indicate that self-employed
people do not reap more utility from their work because instrumental outcomes are different.
9
                                                   
7 The weights used are panel weights controlling for panel attrition in case of the GSOEP, and cross-sectional
weights in case of the BHPS and the SHP.
8 Strictly, the results have to be interpreted by looking at the marginal effects for each variable, as the estimated
coefficients of an ordered logit regression do not have any intuitive interpretation. The marginal effects for the
variable “self-employed“, indicating the change of the probability that an individual is more satisfied with work
by one point when he or she is self-employed rather than employed, are 2.0% for Germany, 4.5% for UK and
8.7% for Switzerland (probability change for the highest score of the job satisfaction variable). The magnitude of
the marginal effects can more easily be assessed, however, if, for simplicity, one uses an OLS estimator rather
than ordered logit. The estimated coefficients for the variable „self-employed“ from OLS-regressions are 0.22
for Germany, 0.16 for UK, and 0.28 for Switzerland.
9 One caveat to be made is that potential measurement errors might bias the results. As already indicated in
footnote 6 in the data section, self-employed people are relatively more reluctant to state their income than
employed people, and it has also been found that they tend to underreport their incomes (e.g. Joulfaian and Rider
1998 for the US). However, such measurement errors seem not to be a major problem for our estimates. If the
regressions in table 1 (and all the other regressions in this paper) are estimated excluding the income and
working time variables, the self-employment results remain qualitatively very similar. This is also important
because income and wages have to be considered as endogenous variables in the context of this study. If
procedural utility from self-employment is completely reflected in a compensating wage differential, one should
not include income and working time variables in the regression, because otherwise the utility differential from
self-employment is overestimated.13
If the satisfaction differences cannot be attributed to outcome considerations, however, this
suggests that there are non-instrumental reasons at work that make the self-employed happier
with their jobs. In the following sections, it is further investigated whether it is procedural
utility from being independent vs. being subject to a hierarchy that explains this result.
4.2.  Analyzing job satisfaction effects of self-employment in depth
Before further investigating procedural utility, it seems warranted to more precisely address
the question of whether higher job satisfaction among self-employed persons is indeed a
robust result. For example, the regressions in table 1 do not consider the possibility that self-
employed people may be a selection of people that have a natural tendency to be more
satisfied with their jobs, or are in other respects different than employees. The estimated
coefficients would then not reflect non-instrumental benefits from being self-employed, but
merely personality differences between the two groups. This concern is addressed using two
different methodologies.
Fixed effects estimates
First, individual fixed effects regressions are run for West Germany and Britain, where the
panel structure of the surveys allows one to observe the same persons moving into self-
employment or out of it. The results from these linear fixed effects regressions
10 indicate that
the job satisfaction effects of self-employment are a robust phenomenon. Table 2 contains
three different specifications for each country. In a first step, the same specifications as in
table 1 are estimated including individual fixed effects (model I). The results show that people
who either move in or out of self-employment are on average more satisfied with their jobs
when they are self-employed. The estimated coefficients for the variable ‘self-employed’ are
of somewhat smaller magnitude than those reported in table 1, but still statistically
significant.
11
                                                   
10 As ordered logit fixed effects estimators are not yet commonly available, the analysis is carried out using an
OLS fixed effects estimator.
11 Note that the variable ‚self-employed’ only captures job satisfaction changes for people that either move from
employment into self-employment or from self-employment into employment. People that change from
unemployment (or non-employment) into self-employment and vice versa are not included in the sample,
basically because there are no job satisfaction measures available for individuals that do not have a job.14
Table 2: Self-Employment and Job Satisfaction:
Fixed Effects Regressions for Germany and the United Kingdom
Dependent variable: job satisfaction
Variable West Germany United Kingdom





















































































































No. of obs, 70‘229 70‘229 70‘028 52‘022 52‘022 52‘022
No. of individ. 11‘700 11‘700 11‘668 13‘380 13‘380 13‘380
Avg. obs. per
individual
6.0 6.0 6.0 3.9 3.9 3.9
F 14.24** 14.13** 14.32** 9.17** 9.18** 9.29**
Notes: OLS regressions with individual fixed effects. In addition to the variables shown, the regressions include
the same variables for age, education, job, industry, and year as in table 1. Significance levels: ° 0.1 < p < 0.05, *
0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
Data sources: GSOEP 1984-2000, BHPS 1991-1999.
One aspect not captured by model I, however, is that it might make a difference whether one
enters or leaves self-employment. Model II allows for such differences by splitting up
changers into three subgroups: those who become self-employed and stay self-employed
during the observation period (“in-movers”), those who leave self-employment and stay15
employed during the observation period (“out-movers”), and those who change more than
once between employment and self-employment (“multiple changers”). This partitioning can
also address further concerns about selection; arguably, the first group can be considered as
those who become entrepreneurs and successfully stay so, while the second group might leave
self-employment and stay employed for equally good reasons (e.g. because they somehow
failed). The results from model II show that for both West Germany and Britain, the major
part of the self-employment effect indeed stems from those people that become self-employed
and stay so. “In-movers” report major and highly significant increases in job satisfaction after
having moved into self-employment.
12  In contrast, “out-movers” become slightly more
satisfied with their jobs after they have left self-employment (although not significantly). The
estimates thus indicate that “in-movers” as well as ”out-movers” improve their job situation
after a change, but the first group much more so than the second, resulting in an average
positive effect of being self-employed.
One concern with the estimates for the “in-movers” might be that they just reflect a successful
change in the job situation, an effect that also people who simply change jobs possibly
experience. To rule this alternative explanation out, model III compares “in-movers” to a
group of employed people that changes exactly once to a new firm during the observation
period. These “job changers” are likely to be a suitable comparison group because they
successfully change jobs, sticking with their new employer. The results from model III show
that “job changers” indeed report significantly increased job satisfaction after moving to a
new firm. Nevertheless, the positive effects are much smaller than those for people who
become self-employed (the coefficients on the variables “in-movers” and “job changers” are
significantly different at any conventional levels).
13 Thus, for both West Germany and Britain,
we find robust evidence that people moving into self-employment enjoy higher utility from
their work, even when unobserved individual heterogeneity, the effects of a shift in the job
situation, and changes in instrumental outcomes are controlled for.
                                                   
12 “Multiple changers” also report somewhat higher job satisfaction when they are self-employed, although this
result is only statistically significant for the British sample.
13 Note also that the coefficients for the „out-movers“ (model II) are of similar size as the coefficients for „job
changers“, i.e. people moving out of self-employment do not improve their job satisfaction more than employed
people who change jobs.16
A “natural experiment” on self-employment creation
The second approach applied here to study the job satisfaction effects of self-employment
takes advantage of a unique situation that created a sort of ‘natural experiment’ on self-
employment creation. After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, East Germany experienced a
fundamental and largely unexpected change in the structure of its economy. Notably with
respect to self-employment, the situation changed dramatically: for the first time it became a
realistic option for East Germans. Self-employment was severely restricted under the socialist
regime in the German Democratic Republic, because it did not fit into a socialist economic
system. As a consequence, the ratio of self-employment in the workforce is estimated at a low
2.1% for the last year of the GDR (Hammer 1999, see also Lechner and Pfeiffer 1993). East
Germans were first sampled in the GSOEP in 1990 and every year thereafter. The GSOEP
thus offers the unique possibility to observe the developments in self-employment and its
consequences in the ex-GDR regions after 1989.
Table 3 summarizes the results from this natural experiment on self-employment creation. It
can be observed that the sudden absence of restrictions on self-employment indeed created a
steady and substantial rise in the ratio of self-employed people in the workforce. Already in
1990, the ratio had risen from 2.1% to 3.4%, and it grew to 7.3% in the three years until 1993.
Afterwards the ratio approached a stable 7.5% - 8.5%, converging approximately to the ratios
of self-employment found in West Germany at this time. What were the effects on job
satisfaction that the people flowing into self-employment experienced? The results presented
in table 3 indicate that they are substantial. The ordered logit regressions for the East German
workforce presented contain the same variables as the one for West Germany in table 1 and
are run separately for every year. For the first year 1990, the group of self-employed people is
split into those that were in self-employment already before 1989, and those that became self-
employed right after the lifting of the iron curtain.
14 For the years after, only the net effect for
all self-employed people is presented.
15 The effects of becoming self-employed can most
                                                   
14 This is possible because in the first wave of the GSOEP that sampled East Germans (1990), they were asked
some questions about their past in the GDR. Most imporantly, it is known whether individuals had became self-
employed only after December 1989, or were self-employed already before. In 1990, about 25% of all self-
employed had moved into self-employment after the lifting of the iron curtain.
15 This seems warranted because after 1990, the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ self-employed does not
make much sense anymore. First, in the year 1990 the old self-employed might just have experienced a one-time
boost in their job satisfaction, because administrative and other restrictions present under the GDR regime
ceased to apply, a situation that normalized after 1990. Second, the old self-employed make up a smaller part of
the total number of self-employed with the ratio of self-employed sharply rising after 1989. Many people
become newly self-employed, or if they are sampled for the first time in the GSOEP and state that they are self-
employed, it can plausibly be assumed that they are a ‘new’ self-employed. At the same time, there are also17
strikingly be illustrated by those people who moved into self-employment right in 1990. Their
job satisfaction is by a magnitude higher than that of employed East Germans at the time (the
estimated coefficient of 1.340 amounts to approx. 1.5 index points on a job satisfaction scale
from 0-10). Note that this effect is not due to a generally low job satisfaction among the
employed in East Germany working in still mainly socialist firms; in fact, the average job
satisfaction in the East German work force was as high in 1990 as in West Germany (7.20 vs.
7.25); it only dropped sharply afterwards (probably because of the onset of privatizations and
tougher economic conditions like rising unemployment). Moreover, it is not the case that
intrinsically more satisfied people were more likely to become self-employed after the fall of
the Berlin wall. The 1990 regression includes a variable on the “life satisfaction five years
ago”; it captures the answers of East Germans to the question of how they rated their general
satisfaction with life back in the GDR times in 1985. If only intrinsically satisfied (or
dissatisfied) people would have become self-employed after the fall of the iron curtain, the
inclusion of this variable would lower the estimated coefficient on the ‘newly self-employed’
to zero.
16 Table 3 furthermore indicates that, for every year, a positive and mostly significant
coefficient of being self-employed is estimated; this shows that the large share of people
moving into self-employment indeed enjoyed higher subsequent job satisfaction than their
counterparts who had remained employed over the period (over and above objective
outcomes like income or working hours). The results also hold if a fixed effects model for the
whole period from 1990-2000 is estimated (which again only considers observed ‘changers’
from employment into self-employment in the estimation of the self-employed coefficient).
                                                                                                                                                                   
some people leaving self-employment after 1990, although the average ratio sharply increases; this is also
captured in the estimated net effect of the variable “self-employed”.
16 The results on the self-employment variables remain qualitatively very similar when the variable on „life












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To summarize results so far, the ‘fixed effects’ and the ‘natural experiment’ approaches
presented lead us to conclude that self-employed persons are indeed more satisfied with their
jobs. Moreover, this can be attributed to non-instrumental benefits from work, as the
regressions control for important instrumental variables. The following section explores this
issue in more detail.
4.3.  Testing the effects of hierarchy size
The main argument of this paper is that the self-employed may be more satisfied with their
jobs because there is a fundamental procedural utility difference between “independence” and
“being subject to a hierarchy”. Assuming for a moment that this argument is correct, it can be
expanded to create a more precise empirical test of procedural utility. If self-employed people
indeed value the absence of a hierarchy, it would only be consistent to expect that people also
prefer smaller hierarchies to larger hierarchies. In fact, complete independence and strict
hierarchy are only two extreme points on a potential continuum. If procedural utility has
normal properties, it seems natural that procedural utility continuously decreases the more
individuals lose their independence, and the more they are subject to a hierarchy. This idea
can be empirically implemented by using the size of the organization individuals work in as a
proxy for the intensity of hierarchy. Most self-employed people work in small companies.
17
Thus, the inclusion of organization size into the regressions should substantially lower the
estimated coefficient for self-employed if procedural disutility from hierarchy plays a role. It
would mean that the self-employed are not only more satisfied with their work because they
are their own bosses, but also because, compared to their employed counterparts, they tend to
work in smaller hierarchies. At the same time, one should observe that job satisfaction
decreases the larger the size of a hierarchy employed individuals work in, ceteris paribus.
The results of such an empirical test are presented in table 4. It contains the same job
satisfaction regressions as in table 1 for West Germany, Britain and Switzerland, but they are
augmented with information on the size of the hierarchy individuals work in. The results
show that the job satisfaction premium among the self-employed stems to a considerable
extent from procedural utility from independence vs. hierarchy. When including the size of a
firm, the coefficient on ‘self-employed’ is lowered by about one sixth in the case of Germany,
                                                   
17 In West Germany, the median employee works in a firm with 100-200 workers, and the median self-employed
person in a firm with 5-19 workers. In the United Kingdom, the median employee works in a firm with 50-99
workers, and the median self-employed person in a firm with 1-2 workers. In Switzerland, the numbers are 25-
49 workers and 1-4 workers, respectively.20
by half in the case of Britain, and by about over a half in the case of Switzerland. This means
that the self-employed are substantially more satisfied than employees because the average
employee works in a larger hierarchy, which seems to constitute a disutility. Still, the positive
and mostly significant coefficients estimated for the variable ‘self-employed’ in all three
countries indicate that the self-employed are more satisfied than employees working in
similar small enterprises.
18 Being independent seems to be a value in itself, over and above
considerations of hierarchy size.
These results also hold when one considers that the self-employed are often not only their
own bosses, but also the bosses of others. To investigate whether self-employed people are
more satisfied with their work only because they potentially can exert authority over others,
we included several measures on supervisory activity in additional regressions. In the case of
Britain, a variable was used that indicated whether an individual (self-employed or employed)
supervised other people as part of their job. In the case of Switzerland, we used a variable on
the number of people an individual supervises.
19 Although both these variables exert positive
and statistically highly significant effects on job satisfaction, the findings for the self-
employment variables change only marginally (full results not reported; the coeff. on self-
employed for the British sample is 0.137, p<0.05, and for the Swiss sample 0.213, p<0.1).
Thus, individuals seem to derive utility from exerting authority, but this does not explain why
the self-employed are happier with their jobs. Indeed, many of the self-employed in the
samples considered do not have employees or are only at the top of a small hierarchy; in
contrast, there is a substantial amount of employed individuals who have extensive
supervisory tasks because they work in the upper ranks of relatively large hierarchies.
The regressions also present clear evidence that job satisfaction is decreasing with the size of
hierarchy in all three countries, other things equal. This is an interesting result in itself, which
has not been much noted in the literature so far (exceptions are Idson 1990 and Lalive 2002
for the US and Gardner 2001 for the UK). Notably for Britain and Switzerland, the effects of
hierarchy size are substantial. Dissatisfaction from hierarchy seems to peak at a firm size of
about 200-500, and then slightly decreases again as firms get bigger. These findings
                                                   
18 Table 4 shows that the effects are significant for Germany and Britain, but only at the border of statistical
significance for Switzerland. The coefficient for the Swiss self-employed is unprecisely estimated because of a
group of self-employed people that runs companies in the largest firm size category (>1000 employees). These
in total 12 individuals report job satisfaction far below average, for reasons beyond our knowledge. If we remove
these 12 individuals from the sample, the coefficient on the variable “self-employed“ is statistically significant
(coeff.=0.265, p<0.05).
19 For Germany, there was no variable available in the GSOEP that would measure the supervisory activity of
self-employed and employed individuals.21
correspond nicely to the well established fact that, as a compensating variation, larger firms
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.  What makes hierarchy bad, and independence valuable?
The previous analyses have shown that being self-employed (and working in smaller
hierarchies) raises job satisfaction, not because it is connected with obvious instrumental
benefits like higher pay or lower working hours, but because issues of independent vs.
hierarchical decision-making are involved. Nevertheless, there is still the possibility that more
subtle ‘outcome’ aspects are hidden behind this relationship. For example, being self-
employed or working in small hierarchies might be preferred because jobs are more secure, or
simply because work is less stressful. Such aspects might not be properly reflected in the
income and working time variables used, but they constitute instrumental aspects potentially
connected to hierarchy to some extent. On the other hand, self-employment might be
preferred because of genuinely non-instrumental aspects of work closely connected to the
different processes of independence and hierarchy. This last empirical section investigates in
more detail whether individuals value the relative absence of hierarchy for its instrumental or
non-instrumental aspects.
The regressions presented in table 5 exploit the fact that in the British Household Panel,
employees as well as self-employed people were asked some unique questions on their
satisfaction with different aspects of work. The questions can be divided into two rather
instrumentally oriented ones, and two concerned with non-instrumental aspects. With respect
to the first, individuals were asked to state on a scale from 1-7 their satisfaction with their
“job security”, and also their satisfaction with their workload (“the hours you work”). With
respect to the second, the questions asked how satisfied individuals were with “being able to
use their own initiative” and the “actual work itself”. Whereas job security and workload are
instrumental aspects of work, the use of initiative and the actual work itself are closely linked
to notions of process. It is a core characteristic of independence that one can more fully
develop one’s own initiative, and that the tasks can be chosen more freely. The stricter
hierarchical decision-making gets, the more restricted are an individual’s possibilities to enjoy
these non-instrumental benefits from work.25
Table 5: The Sources of Disutility from Hierarchy:
Testing for Instrumental and Noninstrumental Aspects





































































Job security – 0.400**
(0.009)
–





Use of initiative – – 0.391**
(0.013)
Actual work itself – – 1.070**
(0.017)



















No. of obs. 51’925 51’925 37’220
No. of ind. 13’372 13’372 9’275
Time period 1991 - 1999 1991 - 1999 1991 – 1997
F 13.47** 75.95** 65.17**
Notes: Weighted ordered logit regressions. In addition to the variables shown, the regressions include the same
variables on part-time work, age, age squared, sex, and dummies for education, job, industry, and year as in
table 1 for UK. Robust standard errors in parentheses (corrected for repeated observations on individuals).
Significance levels: ° 0.1 < p < 0.05, * 0.01 < p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data source: BHPS 1991-1999.26
Table 5 presents three regressions. In the first column, the job satisfaction regression for
Britain from table 4 is reproduced to facilitate comparison. In the middle column, the
regression is re-estimated including the two instrumental domain satisfaction variables as
explanatory variables. Although these two variables are highly correlated with job
satisfaction, the effects of self-employment and hierarchy size on job satisfaction tend to get
larger when these variables are included. This indicates that dissatisfaction from hierarchies
does not stem from dissatisfaction with instrumental aspects of work. When the two non-
instrumental domain satisfaction measures are included (third column), however, it shows that
they explain the self-employment and hierarchy size effects perfectly. This is strong evidence
that non-instrumental characteristics of work are the reason why the self-employed and
people working in relatively small hierarchies are more satisfied with their jobs.
20 Thus, it can
be concluded that it is indeed procedural utility from being independent that makes self-
employed people more satisfied with their jobs, and that it is procedural disutility from being
subject to a hierarchy that causes dissatisfaction with work among people employed in larger
hierarchies.
Of course, organizations could in principle mimic these non-instrumental characteristics, by
e.g. implementing work practices that give employees more possibilities to use their initiative,
or by enriching work itself. The fact that the self-employment and hierarchy effects reappear
when non-instrumental satisfaction aspects are not controlled for indicates, however, that
many firms fail to do so. It is most likely that the very procedural nature of hierarchy makes it
impossible to run a firm as if it were a group of self-employed people.
5. Conclusions
Procedural utility is a concept that extends the outcome-oriented approach to human well-
being in economics. It proposes that people have preferences about how outcomes are
generated. These preferences about procedures are not instrumental in the sense that people
expect beneficial outcomes. Rather, individuals value procedures per se.
                                                   
20 The results in table 5 remain qualitatively very similar if the regressions are run using a fixed effects estimator
controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Note also that the regression in the third column contains
less observations than the ones in the left and middle columns, because the question on the “use of initative“ was
not asked in 1998 and 1999. The results, however, remain largely unchanged if the regressions in the left and
middle column are estimated with the reduced sample of 1991-1997.27
In this paper, the concept of procedural utility is applied to institutions. Institutions are a
potentially important source of procedural utility, because they constitute the fundamental
rules by which decisions are taken in society. With respect to the economy, hierarchy is of
paramount importance. Nowadays, most production and employment in developed countries
is integrated into organizations based on at least some extent of hierarchical decision-making.
Still, a considerable share of employment is independently undertaken in the form of self-
employment. We empirically test whether individuals value the independence provided by
self-employment as such. Our results confirm that people prefer independence, and the
relative absence of hierarchy, for purely non-instrumental reasons closely connected with
notions of process.
Our study not only provides a more general view of the utility gained from work, but it also
has implications for policy. Following the results reached here, the government should at least
not restrict self-employment opportunities. In many countries, bureaucratic barriers for self-
employment are high. Djankow et al. (2002), for example, show for a large sample of nations
that administrative laws and regulations are often restrictive, making it costly for citizens to
set up their own businesses. At the same time, large numbers of people in the industrial
countries say they would prefer to be self-employed (Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer
2001). Lowering barriers to entry thus seems to be a simple means to promote self-
employment, providing individuals with added, procedural, utility.
21 There might also be a
case for financial state intervention, as insufficient access to credit seems to be another
important reason why many people do not become self-employed (Blanchflower and Oswald
1998). However, such programs also have costs that would have to be balanced against their
procedural utility effects.
In a more general view, the results presented in this paper may contribute to a better
understanding of what individuals value. We submit that individuals gain utility from
procedures over and above the outcome that is thereby generated. In particular, we show that
independence is a value in itself, compared to being subject to a hierarchy.
                                                   
21 Indeed, Djankow et al. (2002) show that high barriers to entry are not beneficial from the viewpoint of society.
Lowering regulations of entry would thus not only promote self-employment, but is likely to have positive
effects also in other respects.28
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Appendix
Table A: Descriptive Statistics
Germany United Kingdom Switzerland
West East
















































































Working part-time 0.23 – 0.23 0.35











































Sex (Female) 0.38 0.47 0.49 0.48
0.39 0.30 0.47 0.36 0.51 0.29 0.49 0.35
Education 7 categ. 7 categ. 12 categ. 10 categ.
Job dummies 88 categ. 88 categ. 73 categ. 31 categ.
Industry dummies 45 categ. 45 categ. 10 categ. 14 categ.
No. of obs. 70’229 20’064 52’022 3’431
66’314 3’915 19’029 1’035 45’834 6’188 3’081 350
No. of individ. 11’700 4’254 13’380 3’431
10’580 1’120 3’930 324 11’359 2’021 3’081 350
Time period 1984 - 2000 1990-2000 1991 - 1999 1999
Notes: Unweighted means. Standard deviations in parentheses. Job satisfaction is measured on a scale from 0 to
10 in Germany, 1 to 7 in UK, and 0 to 10 in Switzerland. The total income variable consists of gross monthly
income in Germany, net monthly income in UK, and net yearly income in Switzerland. Data on tenure and
parttime work is missing for East Germany.
Data sources: GSOEP 1984-2000, BHPS 1991-1999, SHP 1999.CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
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